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MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: THE NEED 
FOR AN EXPANDED CHAPTER IX 
New York City's default crisis in 1975 presented to Congress and 
the nation the possibility of a major municipality's entering the 
federal bankruptcy court. 1 Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, as 
recently amended by Congress,2 provides the exclusive remedy by 
which local governmental units 3 may obtain relief from burden-
some indebtedness. Unlike certain other chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, Chapter IX is limited to a voluntary composition or 
extension of indebtedness. 4 In recent years municipalities have 
developed complex systems of financing, while experiencing un-
precedented expansion in the services which they must provide. 
Accordingly, a mere composition of municipal indebtedness is no 
longer adequate, because a composition can only reduce the debt 
or postpone the default. In order to solve the problems which 
precipitate a particular financial crisis, a complete reorganization 
of municipal finances may be necessary. 5 However, under Chapter 
IX bankruptcy courts are not empowered to effectuate such a 
comprehensive reorganization as a part of the relief available 
through a municipal bankruptcy proc;eeding. 6 This article will 
1 In addition to New-York ·ciiy, man·y· other cities are finding it increasingly difficult to 
provide existing levels of services while maintaining a balanced budget. Tax bases are 
shrinking at the same time that demands for.wages, fringe benefits, pensions and goods are 
spiraling. City Financial Emergencies: The Intergovernmental Dimension, REP. No. A-42, 
ADVISORY COMMIS_SION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 31 (1973) [hereinafter cited 
as Financial Emergencies]. 
2 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (to be codified as 11 U .S.C. §§ 
401-418) (1976). 
3 The current Chapter IX lists a wide variety of government units including towns, 
counties, improvement districts, school districts and incorporated authorities. Bankruptcy 
Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 81, 90 Stat. 315 (to be codifed as 11 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) ). 
Although this article focuses upon the needs of cities or towns, the arguments are equally 
applicable to all types of local governmental units. This article will use the terms city, 
municipality and petitioner interchangeably to describe the petitioning governmental entity. 
• 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, ,i 81.27 (4th ed. 1975). A composition is an agreement 
between a debtor and his creditors where the latter agree to accept less than the whole 
amount of their claims. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 357 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). An agreement on 
the part of a debtor to pay his debts in full but with a postponed maturity date is termed an 
extension. Id. at 694. 
5 See Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 85-86. 
6 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. 94-260, § 83, 90 Stat. 316 (to be co~ified as 11 U .S.C. § 
403, ·(1976)), limits the power of the court: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall be 
construed to limit or impair the power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, 
any municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State in the exercise of its political 
or governmental powers, including expenditure therefore .... " See also Bankruptcy Act, 
ch. 9, Pub. L. 94-260, § 82(c), 90 Stat. 316 ~to be codified as II U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976)). 
91 
92 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:91 
explore the desirability of granting more comprehensive powers to 
bankruptcy courts and will consider the constitutional authority for 
such an expansion of Chapter IX. It will also advance specific 
suggestions for this modification of Chapter IX. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CHAPTER IX 
The basic premise of the law of municipal corporations is that a 
municipality is "a creature of the State. " 7 It is created by charter 
granted by the state legislature, and its power is derived from and 
dependent upon the sovereign power of the state. 8 Although the 
municipality exercises sovereign power, that power is delegated to 
it by the state, and may be withdrawn at will. 9 
The tenth amendment protects the sovereign power of the state, 
including its control over its municipal corporations, from usurpa-
tion by the federal government. 10 Although the power to enact 
bankruptcy laws is an enumerated federal power under article I, 
section 8 of the Constitution, 11· the tenth amendment may limit 
Congress in the enactment of federal legislation dealing with 
municipal bankruptcies. At issue is the extent to which a federal 
bankruptcy court may permissibly direct or control the affairs of a 
municipality without infringing upon the sovereign power of the 
State. 
In enacting the original Chapter IX in 1934, 12 Congress merely 
provided a procedure by which a local governmental unit could 
voluntarily enter the bankruptcy court with a plan of readjustment. 
If it could obtain acceptances from two-thirds of its creditors, the 
petitioning governmental unit could get a readjustment plan con-
firmed by the court and have it enforced against nonconsenting 
7 I E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 4;J 3.02 (3d ed. 1971). 
8 Id. 
9 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 529 (1936). 
10 The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The exercise of a power not granted to the Congress 
by the Constitution (e.g., education) may be exercised by the state. Congress cannot take 
these sovereign powers from the state. See I E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ,i 
1.45 (3d ed. 1971). A state may, however, consent to federal interference with its sovereign 
powers. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52 (1938). 
11 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, says, "The Congress shall have Power to .... establish uniform 
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States .... " 
12 Act of May 24, 1934, ch, 345, 48 Stat. 798. 
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creditors. 13 Significantly, Chapter IX also provided that the state 
could require its approval or consent to the proceedings. 14 
In Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 
One, 15 the Supreme Court held that this original enactment of 
Chapter IX, as applied to a water district, violated the tenth 
amendment by impairing the sovereign power of the state, since 
implementation of Chapter IX procedures "might materially re-
strict" the water district's control over its fiscal affairs. 16 Chapter 
IX was sufficiently related to the topic of bankruptcies to be within 
the scope of Congress' enumerated bankruptcy power. Neverthe-
less, the Court concluded that Chapter IX constituted a threat to 
the "independence of the States" 17 in violation of the tenth 
amendment. In order to preserve the independence of the states, 
"the means and instrumentalities employed for carrying on the 
operations of their governments, for preserving their existence, 
... should be left free and unimpaired." 18 The Court found the 
consent of the state to a Chapter IX proceeding to be insufficient to 
preserve its sovereignty and to validate the constitutionality of 
Chapter IX. Relying upon United States v. Butler, 19 the Court 
reasoned that the powers of Congress could not be enlarged by the 
consent of the states to such an extent, since Congress could only 
exercise powers which were expressly granted to it. 2° Further-
13 Id. The petition had to be accompanied by a plan of readjustment that had been 
accepted by creditors holding not less than 51 percent in amount of its outstanding obliga-
tions (30 percent in the case of drainage, irrigation, reclamation, and levee districts). After 
the plan had been approved by the judge, it was to be submitted to the creditors for their 
acceptance. It could not be confirmed until it had been accepted by creditors holding 
two-thirds in amount of the claims against it. Although it is unclear exactly how or when the 
requirement applied, the statute appears to have included an additional requirement of 
acceptance by 75 percent in amount of the claims of all creditors. Id. 48 Stat. 801. Because of 
the statute's brief period of existence, there does not appear to have been any discussion of 
when these two standards were applicable. This 75 percent requirement was absent from the 
statute's language when it was re-enacted in 1937. See Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, § 
83(d), 50 Stat. 657. The 1934 statute contained a "cram-down" provision which eliminated 
the need for the vote of any creditor or class of creditors if its claims were not affected by the 
plan or if the plan made provision for protection or payment of their claims. Once a plan had 
been confirmed, it was binding upon the municipality and all of its creditors. Act of May 24, 
1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798. See generally Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement 
Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 524-26 (1936). 
14 Act of May 24, I 934, ch. 345, § 80(k), 48 Stat. 802. The statute contemplated the filing of 
a petition against a municipality only by its creditors. See id .. § 80(a), 48 Stat. 798. 
15 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
16 Id. at 530. 
i1 Id. 
18 Id. at 528. The Court relied heavily upon the analogy to the tax-exempt status which the 
water district's bonds enjoyed, and inferred that this status reflected the constitutional 
limitation against interference in a state's fiscal affairs. The majority perceived a similar 
limitation upon Chapter IX and. therefore, found it to be unconstitutional in its entirety. Id. 
at 528-30. 
19 297 U.S. I (1936). 
20 298 U.S. at 53 I. 
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more, the Court, citing United States v. Constantine,2 1 held that 
state sovereignty could not be surrendered by consent or legisla-
tion. 22 
In dissent, Justice Cardozo argued that the statutory consent 
provision required that Chapter IX be sustained as a constitutional 
exercise of the bankruptcy power. 23 He analogized the bankruptcy 
power to the taxing power, citing authority to the effect that a state 
may consent to taxation by the federal government. 24 Thus, while 
the majority relied upon the analogy to the taxing power to declare 
Chapter IX unconstitutional, 25 Cardozo concluded that this anal-
ogy compelled the opposite result. 
After the Ashton decision Congress enacted a second Chapter IX 
which was virtually identical to its predecessor. 26 In United States 
v. Bekins, 27 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
second Chapter IX, distinguishing Ashton on the grounds that the 
new Chapter IX was "carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon 
the sovereignty of the State." 28 In particular, the Court referred to 
the section of the act expressly prohibiting restrictions on the 
power of the state to control the debtor municipality. 29 The Court 
21 296 U.S. 287 (1935). 
22 298 U.S. at 531. Neither of the· precedents cited by the Court compelled the result 
reached in Ashton, since both dealt with taxes which the Court held to be beyond the power 
of Congress to impose. Butler dealt with a tax levied upon the processors of farm products 
which the Court held to be a regulation of agricultural production beyond the power given by 
the taxing clause. Constantine held that the acquiescence of the state could not enlarge the 
power of Congress in order to allow it to levy an excise tax solely on liquor dealers who 
violated state liquor taxes. in Ashton the question was not one of power, since the Court had 
already acknowledged that Congress' bankruptcy power extended to such a setting. Rather 
the issue involved a blending of the legitimate interests of the state and federal governments. 
Butler can be further distinguished in that it involved the consent of an individual as opposed 
to that of a sovereign. 
23 298 U.S. at 541 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
24 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). 
25 See note 18 supra. 
26 Act of August 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653. In this act counties were omitted 
from the class of petitioners eligible for relief. (They were again added to the Act in 1940. 
Act of June 28, 1940, Pub. L. No. 669, 54 Stat. 667 .) The draftsmen of the 1937 Act believed 
that counties were more necessary arms of state government and hence possessed a greater 
degree of sovereignty than improvement districts or cities. This omission was viewed as the 
crucial distinction between the new Chapter IX and the old one. Proposed Amendments to 
the Bankruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R. 2505 Before the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 51-52 
(1937). 
The former act provided for a "Plan of Adjustment," while the new act provided for a 
''Plan of Composition." Instead of requiring consent on the part of an agency of the state, 
the new act required that "the petitioner is authorized by law to take all action necessary 
... to carry out the plan." Act of August 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 302, § 83(e)(6), 50 Stat. 658. 
See generally Patterson, Municipal Debt Adjustme(lfs Under the Bankruptcy Act, 90 U. PA. 
L. REV. 520, 526-30 (1942). In substance, the new act, like its predecessor, was confined to 
measures essential for the proposal, acceptance and confirmation of a plan of composition 
binding upon all creditors affected by the plan. 5 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY~ 81 .27 (4th ed. 
1975). 
27 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
28 /d. at 51. 
29 Id. 
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further emphasized that the act expressly prohibited bankruptcy 
court interference with the debtor municipality's political or gov-
ernmental powers, property, or revenues essential for governmen-
tal purposes, and income-producing property. 30 Unlike Ashton, 
Bekins suggested that the tenth amendment permitted the states to 
consent to federal interference in their affairs. 31 Moreover, the 
Bekins Court adopted the analogy between the taxing power and 
the bankruptcy power which Cardozo had advanced in his Ashton 
dissent. Thus, the Court concluded that the provision for state 
consent to a Chapter IX proceeding invited "the intervention of the 
bankruptcy power" in order to save a municipal corporation which 
the state was "powerless to rescue." 32 
Since Bekins, Chapter IX has served as the basic framework for 
municipal bankruptcy legislation. In 1976 it was revised in re-
sponse to the fiscal crisis facing New York City. 33 This revision 
eliminated the requirement that the petition be accompanied by the 
written consent of 51 percent of the municipality's creditors, a 
restriction which had effectively precluded many major 
municipalities from relief under Chapter IX. 34 The revision also 
made available to the petitioner, pursuant to court approval, 
specific powers to be used in reordering the financial affairs of the 
municipality. 35 It is expected that more extensive changes may be 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 52. 
32 Id. at 54. As other commentators have observed, it is difficult to reconcile Ashton and 
Bekins on any meaningful grounds because the two acts are so similar. See, e.g., Note. 
Reform of Creditor Participation Procedures in Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 423, 
436 n.80 (1976). It is arguable that these two decisions simply illustrate the shift in the 
Court's view of the scope of federal power that occurred at that time. Compare. e.g .. Carter 
v. Carter Coal Co .. 298 U.S. 238 ( 1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936); Hammer 
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U .S 548 (1937); 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937). For a discussion of these and 
other such cases. see Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy. 1933-1946, 
pts. I & 2, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 883 (1946). 
33 Bankruptcy Act. ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (to be codified as 11 U .S.C. §§ 
401-418 (1976)). 
34 The identity of many creditors who hold bearer bonds is unascertainable. Klein. The 
New Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act. PRAC. LAW., June I, 1976. at 76. Instead of the 
written consent requirement. the municipality must satisfy one of four less stringenl re-
quirements. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9. Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 3 I 7 (to be codified as 
II U.S.C. § 404 (1976)). 
35 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260. §§ 82(b), 85(g), 85(h), 90 Stat. 316. 317 (to 
be codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 405(g). 405(h) (1976)). The powers which are available to 
the petitioner in proceedings under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act are: (I) the power 
to reject executory contracts and unexpired leases; (2) the power to issue first priority 
certificates of indebtedness; (3) the power to avoid fraudulent transfers; and (4) the power to 
set aside voidable preferences. Klein, supra note 34, at 77. For a summary of the provisions 
of the new statute. see King. Municipal Insolvency: Chapter IX, Old ai1d New: Chapter IX 
Rules, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55 (1976). 
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made in 1977 or 1978, as Congress considers a comprehensive 
revision of the entire Bankruptcy Act. 36 
II. FUTURE FINANCIAL STABILITY CANNOT BE 
ASSURED BY A COMPOSITION ALONE 
For a financially embarrassed municipality relief under the 
Bankruptcy Act is a remedy of last resort. 37 The filing of a Chapter 
IX petition has a drastic impact on the availability of short term 
credit and on the market demand for municipal bonds, thus militat-
ing against the filing of frivolous petitions. 38 A Chapter IX proceed-
ing is warranted only where efforts to resolve the crisis outside the 
bankruptcy process have already failed. 
' Under the current act, as amended, and under the bills pending 
in the Congress, the role of the bankruptcy court is limited to the 
confirmation or disapproval of a composition plan submitted by the 
municipality. 39 Chapter IX provides for a simple composition of 
debt without any other supervision by the bankruptcy court. 40 
Interference in the fiscal affairs of a Chapter IX petitioner is essen-
tial to the success of a Chapter IX proceeding. However, Chapter 
IX proceedings are expressly designed to preclude .the independent 
management or control of fiscal policy which is often necessary to 
facilitate the restructuring of the finances of an embarrassed munic-
ipality. 41 Thus, the court is often unable to prevent future defaults 
3 •·1n 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States made its report 
proposing a new bankruptcy statute. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. II 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Bankruptcy Act]. This bill represents a major rework-
ing of the structure of the present bankruptcy legislation. 
In 1977, a bill was introduced into the Congress which adopted many of the suggested 
changes of the Commission, but retained much of the present statute's structure. H.R. 6, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Bill]. 
The revised Chapter IX, which will be relabeled as Chapter VIII by the Proposed 
Bankruptcy Act, relies largely upon the present statute. The arguments presented here apply 
with equal force to this new legislation. Where there are pertinent differences they will be 
noted. 
37 Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 85. 
38 Id. at 84. 
39 Section 82(c) of Chapter IX, (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1976)), prevents the 
court from interfering with a petitioner's: (a) political or governmental powers; (b) property 
or revenues necessary for essential governmental purposes; or (c) any of the petitioner's 
income-producing property, unless the plan so provides. The purpose of section 83(c) is to 
restrict the power of the bankruptcy judge to mere approval or disapproval of a proposed 
plan. 
4° Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 85. 
41 Dession, Municipal Debt Adjustment and the Supreme Court, 46. YALE L.J. 199, 216 
(1936). 
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and bankruptcy petitions because it is powerless to remedy inept 
fiscal management by a municipality's elected officials. 42 
Inasmuch as debt adjustment without court supervision is not 
permitted under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, Chapter IX 
is an anomaly. 43 Allowing a petitioner to avail itself of the benefits 
of a composition proceeding while remaining in complete control of 
its affairs is contrary to the traditions and the fundamental sense of 
equity which theoretically permeate the bankruptcy proceeding. 44 
The confirmation of a composition plan in these circumstances 
might be viewed as an abuse of the court's jurisdiction, because the 
mismanaged municipality receives not only judicial protection 
from suits by its creditors, 45 but also a partial discharge from its 
debts. 46 In effect, the court binds nonconsenting creditors to a plan 
formulated by a debtor which cannot be compelled to rid itself of 
financial mismanagement. 47 Unfairness is inherent in such a situa-
tion, and remedial inadequacy is practically assured. 48 
Moreover, a compositon without meaningful supervision is un-
fair to holders of certificates of indebtedness issued by the court as 
· 
42 The limited power of th·e bankruptcy court is illustrated by the case of one Texas 
municipality which has undergone four Chapter IX proceedings since the early l930's. The 
courts have been unable "to force a changing cast of elected officials to comply with 
voluntarily accepted settlements of the past." Financial Emergencies, s11pra note I, at 85. 
43 For example, Chapter X provides for the appointment of an independent trustee to 
operate the business under the close supervision of the court. 11 U .S.C. §§ 586-591 (1970). 
Chapter XI contemplates continued operation of the business by the debtor, 11 U .S.C. § 
743. However, upon initiating a Chapter XI proceeding, the debtor becomes a "debtor in 
possession" and his power over the.business is markedly changed due to the control of the 
court. See generally 8 W. COLLIER, si1pra note 4, ,i,i 6.30-6.32. 
44 See American United Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 146 
(1940); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939); Local Loan .Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 
240 (1934); Bankruptcy Act§ 2(a), 11 U .S.C. § I !(a) (1970). See also Glenn, Essentials of 
Bankr11ptcy: Prevention of Fra11d, and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REv. 373 (1937). 
45 Bankruptcy Act,. ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(c), 90 Stat. 318 (to be codified as 11 
U .S.C. §. 405(e) (1976) ), sets up an .automatic stay on suits by creditors at the filing of a 
Chapter IX petition. See also Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 36, §§ 4-501, 8-101; 
House Bill, s11pra note 36, § 944. 
46 See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 95(b), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 
11 U .S.C. § 4l5(b) (1976) ). See also Proposed Bankruptcy Act, s11pra note 36, § 8-308(b); 
House Bill, s11pra note 36, § 944. 
47 See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 95(a), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11 
U .S.C. § 415 (a) (1976) ). In addition to this power to bind nonconsenting creditors, the 1976 
amendments to Chapter IX grant additional powers to be used by the municipality in 
reorganizing its financial affairs. See note 35 s11pra. 
48 In a straight bankruptcy proceeding involving an individual, the debtor receives a 
discharge from his dischargeable debts, but he is also forced to liquidate his nonexempt 
property for the benefit of his creditors. A municipality cannot be forced to liquidate its 
property in this manner, but since it may reduce ifs debts even as to nonconsenting 
creditors, equity should require local officials to implement sound financial measures as a 
quid pro quo for the discharge of indebtedness. Under current Chapter IX, however, a 
municipality cannot be compelled to reform its unsound financial policies. See notes 39-42 
and accompanying text supra. 
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part of the bankruptcy proceedings49 and to those future creditors 
of the municipality who thereafter extend credit to the municipality 
only to see it founder again in future years. Any future creditor can 
be said to have relied solely upon his own perception of the munic-
ipality's fiscal stability in extending credit. However, when a bank-
ruptcy court approves the issuance of certificates of indebtedness, 
it is possible that some takers will perceive this approval as a 
determination by the court that the municipality will be financially 
rehabilitated and will be able to repay these certificates when no 
such determination has been made. 
The court is not completely without weapons in combating these 
inequities. Under the present Chapter IX "feasibility" is a condi-
tion for confirmation of a plan. 50 If the bankruptcy judge finds that 
the petitioner's plan is not feasible, he can refuse to confirm it. This 
prevents enforcement of the plan against nonconsenting creditors 
and prevents the discharge of dischargeable claims. 51 However, 
the feasibility requirement is not an effective solution to Chapter 
IX problems for three reasons. The feasibility condition is only 
intended to ensure that the petitioner will have adequate tax rev-
enues to make required payments to creditors under the plan. 52 
Accordingly, the prospects of future default and the chances of 
financial rehabilitation are not required to be considered. Second, 
it is arguable that a bankruptcy court's nonconfirmation ofa munic-
ipality's plan, because of the failure of local officials to develop a 
sound fiscal policy, would constitute interference with the munici-
pality's political or governmental functions. Such an interference is 
expressly prohibited by the act. 53 Finally, public policy considera-
tions compel an expedited proceeding. Citizens who are dependent 
upon the petitioner's services should not be subjected to extended 
periods of uncertainty while the court bargains with city officials in 
an effort to develop an acceptable plan. 
49 The power to issue first priority certification of indebtedness was among those given to 
a petitioner by the 1976 amendments. See note 35 supra. The Commission's proposed 
revision of this chapter does not explicitly provide for certificates of indebtedness, although 
the House Bill does. See House Bill, supra note 36, §§ 364, 901. 
50 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 94(b)(I ), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11 
U.S.C. § 414 (b)(I) (1976)). In the context of Chapter XI proceedings this term has been 
construed to mean merely that the provisions of the plan will actually be performed. 9 W. 
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ,r 9.18[1] (4th ed. 1976). "The test is whether the things which are to 
be done after confirmation can be done as a practical matter under the facts." Id. 
51 See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 95, 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11 
U .S.C. § 415 ( 1976) ). The Bankruptcy Act expressly provides that no state law prescribing a 
method of composition can be binding on any creditor without his consent. Bankruptcy Act, 
ch. 9. Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 83, 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 403) (1976)). 
52 H. R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1976). See also note 50 and accom-
panying text supra. 
53 See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c), 90Stat.316 (to be codified as 11 
U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976)). 
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In short, to prohibit additiorial judicial control over the munici-
pality's fiscal affairs is "to forbid a restructuring of the City's fiscal 
system which may be essential to any successful plan of debt 
adjustment. " 54 Even without malfeasance or incompetent fiscal 
management, municipal policymakers may be politically reluctant 
to take the drastic steps necessary to solve the city's financial 
problems. In contrast, an independent federal court can assume 
responsibility for the required restructuring. 55 To undertake this 
role the bankruptcy court must have more control over the debt-
or's fiscal affairs, provided that control is consistent with constitu-
tional limitations. 
III. THE MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY POWER 
AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
The power to establish laws on the subject of bankruptcy is one 
of the enumerated powers of the federal government granted by the 
Constitution.56 The enumerated powers are regarded as plenary in 
nature.57 Accordingly, where a subject is properly within the scope 
of an enumerated power, Congress can legislate preemptively, thus 
effectively depriving states of power to deal with the same sub-
ject. 58 In the area of bankruptcy legislation, federal preemption is 
well established. 59 Thus the congressional power over bankruptcy 
is plenary in nature and may, in the discretion of Congress, be 
extended to all types of debtors. 60 
The scope of an enumerated power, however, may be limited by 
other provisions of the Constitution. With respect to congressional 
legislation affecting municipal bankruptcies the tenth amendment 
54 Hearings on S. 2597 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17· 
(1975) (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman). 
55 Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 85. 
56 See note 11 supra. 
57 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929). See also Prudential 
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (involving the commerce power); Board of 
Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (involving the foreign 
commerce power). · 
58 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), involving the 
Atomic Energy Commission's preemption of state regulation of nuclear power plants. 
59 In International Shoe Cci. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929), which held that the 
Bankruptcy Act superseded an inconsistent state insolvency law, the Court declared that the 
"power of Congress to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies ... is unre-
stricted and paramount." 
60 Note, The Constitutionality of the Municipal Debt Readjustment Act, 35 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 428, 431 (1935). 
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constitutes a possible limitation. 61 The tenth amendment has tradi-
tionally not been viewed as imposing a limitation upon the exercise 
of the enumerated powers.62 Rather, the Supreme Court has ob-
served that the tenth amendment "states but a truism that all is 
retained [by the states] which has not been surrendered. " 63 
The purpose of the tenth amendment, however, is the preserva-
tion of the bifurcation of sovereign power between centralized 
government and the several states. 64 Thus, in Fry v. United 
States, 65 the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the wage 
freeze of the Economic Stabilization Act of 197066 on the basis of 
the commerce clause, stated that the tenth amendment requires 
Congress to respect the integrity of the states and their place in the 
federal system.67 National League of Cities v. Usery 68 reiterated 
the Fry conception of the tenth amendment. 69 National League of 
Cities held that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, which extended minimum wage and overtime pay provisions 
to local government employees, were not within the authority 
granted to the Congress by the commerce clause. 70 The Court 
stated that the FLSA amendments operated ''to directly displace 
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional governmental functions. " 71 Accordingly, this exercise 
of congressional authority was held not to comport with the federal 
system embodied in the Constitution, 72 since it would impair the 
ability of states to function effectively in a federal system. 73 
The Court distinguished Fry, which upheld the application of the 
1970 wage freeze to employees of the state. 74 First, the Court noted 
61 See note IO supra. 
62 In Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945), the Court averred that "[t]he Tenth 
Amendment does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated 
to the national government." This case upheld under the commerce clause the enforcement 
of national labor standards against a manufacturer of goods who shipped in interstate 
commerce. . 
63 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). The Court additionally noted: 
Id. 
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than 
declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had 
been established before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay 
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted 
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. 
64 See Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 575 (1931). 
65 421 U.S. 542 (1975). 
66 Act of August 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799. 
67 421 U.S. at 547 n. 7. "The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that 
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their 
ability to function effectively in a federal system." Id. 
68 96 S.Ct. 2465 (1976). 
69 Id. at 2470. 
70 Id. at 2474. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
1a 1d. 
14 Id. at 2474-75. 
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that the Economic Stabilization Act dealt with a serious problem 
that could be solved only by federal action. Furthermore, the 
statutory provisions at issue in Fry were drafted so that federal-
interference with the states' freedom was for a very limited period 
of time. Third, the congressional enactment in Fry neither dis-
placed the states' choices as to the structure of governmental 
operations, nor did it force the states to reassess choices already 
made. Finally, the act considered in Fry operated to reduce pres, 
sures on state budgets rather than to increase them. 
Chapter IX, like the statute challen$ed in Fry, deals with a 
serious problem for which only the national government can supply 
a remedy. A Chapter IX proceeding infringes upon the states' 
power in only a limited way and for only a limited period of time. 
Additionally, Chapter IX is carefully drafted to preserve the free-
dom of the state in the ultimate decisions regarding the structure of 
municipal operations. 75 Finally, Chapter IX operates to relieve 
state fiscal pressures, not to increase them. In short, Chapter IX 
affects· the states' power over their political subdivisions only in an 
incidental manner. 76 
Additionally, a~ expanded Chapter IX would be consistent with 
the limitations of the tenth amendment since the state retains the 
power to prevent a municipal corporation from filing a Chapter IX 
petition. 77 Chapter IX recognizes that the state must grant to the 
municipality the power to -avail itself of a debt readjustment pro-
75 See note 6 and accompanying text supra. 
76 Arguably, however, the proposed expansions of Chapter IX powers, see Part IV infra, 
might violate the tenth amendment limitation on the exercise of federal power over the states 
recognized in National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). In National League 
the Court stated that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state govern-
ment which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirma-
tive grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits 
it from exercising the authority in that manner," 96 S.Ct. at 2471 (emphasis added). In 
determining whether the proposed expansion of Chapter IX powers would exceed the tenth 
amendment limit, the crucial issue is whether the increased control of the bankruptcy court 
over the municipal debtor is a usurpation of "functions essential to separate and indepen-
dent existence" of the states. Id. Arguably, control by the bankruptcy court over the fiscal 
problems of a municipal debtor would displace "state policies" as to the manner in which 
"the States and their political subdivisions ... will structure delivery of those governmental 
services which their citizens requin:." Id. at 2472. With respect to its impact upon "tradi-
tional aspects of state sovereignty," the proposed expansion of Chapter IX powers might be 
analogized to the 1974 FLSA Amendments voided in National League, rather than to the 
1970 Economic Stabilization Act upheld in Fry. However, such an application of the 
National League rationale to the proposed expansion of Chapter IX powers insufficiently 
considers the federal interest in protecting the creditors of the municipal debtor and re-
habilitating the municipal debtor. Therefore, until the scope of the National League 
rationale is further delineated by the Court, such an expansive interpretation of the tenth 
amendment should be eschewed as inconsistent with the "balancing approach" advanced 
by Mr. Justice Blackmun in his National League concurrence. 
17 See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra. 
102 Journal of Law Refonn [VOL. 10:91 
ceeding before it can file a petition. 78 Moreover, no involuntary 
petitions are allowed to be filed against the municipality. 79 A bank-
ruptcy court, therefore, cannot assertjurisdiction over a municipal-
ity if a state prohibits the petitioner from filing a voluntary petition. 
By granting a city the power to file a Chapter IX petition, the state 
should be deemed to have consented to federal intervention in the 
fiscal affairs of the debtor municipality .80 
In order to ensure financial stability, the federal bankruptcy 
court must have the power to interfere in the fiscal affairs of a 
petitioning municipality. 81 Judicial control of the finances of the 
petitioner would not constitute interference with the delegation of 
powers provided for by state law. A judicially supervised financial 
reorganization of a municipality would not impair the integrity of 
the state or its ability to function in a federal system. 82 In addition 
to the fact that the court acts with the consent of the state, there is 
no reason why the plan of reorganization need interfere in the 
political or electoral processes of the city. 83 The tenth amendment 
should impose no limitation upon the exercise of the bankruptcy 
power with respect to municipal debtors beyond the preservation 
of state power over local government and the prevention of inter-
ference with local political or elective processes. 84 Thus, the ex-
78 See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra. 
79 See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 85(a), 90 Stat. 317 (to be codified as 11 
U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976)). 
80 In order to satisfy the tenth amendment, Chapter IX preserves the power of the state to 
delegate governmental power. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 83, 90 Stat. 316 
(to be codified as II U.S.C. § 403 (1976)). See note 6 supra. Concomitant with the 
preservation of state power, the municipality's political processes must be protected from 
federal interference under Chapter IX. Thus, a federal bankruptcy court cannot become 
involved in the local election process, even though the election jeopardizes the plan of 
composition or adjustment. Spellings v. Dewey, 122 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1941). Furthermore, 
the court in a Chapter IX proceeding must respect the delegation of any municipal powers to 
other state agencies. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,575 (1964), holding that the 
state has absolute discretion respecting the scope of a municipality's powers. See also I E. 
MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 'ii 3.02 (3d ed. 1971). 
81 See generally Part II supra. 
82 See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra. 
83 See note 80 supra. 
84 In his Ashton dissent, Mr. Justice Cardozo noted that the history of bankruptcy reveals 
that the concept of bankruptcy power is an expanding one. 298 U.S. at 535. Broader judicial 
control over a municipal debtor should be viewed as simply another stage in the develop-
ment of the bankruptcy clause. 
The argument presented in this section assumes that Chapter IX as presently written is 
constitutional. In view of the decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 
(1976), it is possible, however, that Chapter IX will come under constitutional attack. This 
issue is raised and discussed in Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the 
New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1976). 
The note suggests that in view of the state government's role in a federal system, one of 
decentralizing governmental power and of serving as a "laboratory" for experimentation 
and change, it is the state's "autonomy interests," i.e., "the state's role as an independent 
legal and political entity." which must be protected to ensure that congressional legislation 
will be constitutionally upheld. Id. at 1886-87. Clearly the state's lawmaking functions must 
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pansion of judicial- control in a Chapter IX proceeding over the 
financial reorganization of a local municipality herein suggested 
should not be precluded. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
The Supreme Court has succinctly stated the goals of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, indicating that "[l]iquidation is not the objec-
be protected, but in other areas the distinction between protected and unprotected interests 
is much less evident. 
When one moves from such basic elements of statehood to the functions of the 
states in collecting revenues and providing services, however, clear facial identifi-
cation of autonomy interests are no longer possible. Certainly, the state must be 
free to collect some revenue to support its continued existence and to provide basic 
governmental services. In the economic context, however, the state necessarily 
functions in a complex environment of interacting state and national policies, and 
the basic purposes of federalism do not require the complete isolation of the state 
as an economic actor. Congressional legislation affecting this environment, how-
ever, may in some cases so constrict the structural or fiscal operations of the state 
as to threaten the state's ability to enact and enforce its laws, maintain its gov-
ernmental structure, or provide critical and necessarily public services. 
Id. at 1887. 
The note proposes that any statute which infringes upon state autonomy interests must 
satisfy two tests in order to be constitutional. Id. at 1888-91. First, the procedure utilized 
must allow state interests to be fully considered. The suggestion is made by the author that 
the present Chapter IX effectively allows state concerns to be raised because only tl,e 
municipality may initiate a proceeding, and because the plan of adjustment is formulated and 
submitted to the court by the municipality. The second requirement is that the federal 
legislation must ensure substantive protection of the state's autonomy interests utilizing a 
test much like the "least restrictive alternative" test used in other constitutional areas. 
So long as adequate process is provided and the accomodation requirement is 
met - in other words, so long as the interests of the states have been considered 
and represented as fully as possible in the federal forum - then the purposes of 
judicial scrutiny have been fulfilled and the federal legislation should be considered 
constitutional, regardless of its implications for state autonomy. 
Id. at 1890. 
Although Chapter IX definitely represents an intrusion upon some of the state's autonomy 
interests, the author of the note concludes that it satisfies the constitutional test which he 
has suggested. This conclusion relies heavily upon the prohibitions contained in Bankruptcy 
Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c), 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11 U .S.C. § 402(c) 
(1976) ), and the ability of the municipality to formulate the plan of adjustment to be used, 
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 84, 90 Stat. 317 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 
404 (1976) ). Even in the absence of these two provisions, however, Chapter IX should be 
upheld as constitutional. 
State "autonomy interests" are ultimately protected because Chapter IX does not allow 
the filing of an involuntary-petition against the municipality. The municipality has the initial 
choice of preventing any federal interference in its fiscal affairs and the bankruptcy court 
cannot interfere until the municipality has decided to seek the relief which bankruptcy 
proceedings offer. Even if the court is given more control in the formulation of the plan, the 
state's interests are additionally protected in that the municipality will be heard and will be 
allowed to make objections and suggestions to the court before any plan of adjustment is 
confirmed. 
The role of the bankruptcy judge is also very important in balandng the competing federal 
and state interests involved in a municipal bankruptcy proceeding. See Note, 89 HARV. L. 
REV., supra at 1905. His consideration of the issues should continue to accord the greater 
deference and respect to state interests which are more important here than in a proceeding 
involving a private individual. This role would not be diminished by any of the proposals set 
forth in this article. See Part IV infra. 
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tive" of the reorganization proceeding, but "[r ]ather, the aim is by 
financial restructuring to put back into operation a going con-
cern. " 85 If the liquidation of a municipality were a valid objective 
of a Chapter XI proceeding, then a mere composition would be 
sufficient to ensure a fair and equitable distribution to creditors. 
The bankruptcy court in a Chapter IX proceeding, of course, 
cannot liquidate a municipality. Nevertheless, it should ensure that 
the proceedings result in rehabilitating the fiscal structure of the 
municipality. Proposals to make a Chapter IX proceeding more 
effective should emphasize two goals: (I) a fair and equitable 
distribution to the city's creditors; and (2) the rehabilitation of the 
municipal corporation into a viable operating entity. 
A. Elimination of the Section 82(c) Prohibitions 
The three prohibitions of section 82(c)86 must be removed from 
the Act if the court is to do more than merely approve the 
petitioner's plan of composition. These prohibitions are not essen-
tial for a municipal debt proceeding to satisfy the requiremens of 
the tenth amendment. 87 The retention of these provisions pre-
cludes the judicial control over the debtor which is required for the 
success of the proceeding. Even without other statutory changes, 
the removal of these prohibitions will significantly increase the 
court's power over the debtor. 88 
The bankruptcy legislation which has been proposed by the 
Commission on Bankruptcy Laws does not contain a provision 
similar to section 82(c). 89 Since no explanation for the deletion is 
offered in the accompanying commentaries,90 it may be assumed 
that no major policy shift was envisioned. Bankruptcy courts have 
traditionally possessed inherently broad equitable powers which 
do not depend upon express statutory provisions.91 Thus, without-
85 Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417" U.S. 467. 470 (1974). Baker dealt with the 
reorganization of a railroad, a process raising issues of public policy similar to those 
presented by the Chapter IX petitioner, since the services involved are essential to the 
public. Therefore, the goal of such a reorganization proceeding serves as an appropriate 
model for an expanded Chapter IX proceeding in which the finances of the municipality are 
similarly adjusted. 
86 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c), 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11 
U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976)). See note 39 supra. 
87 See Part III supra. 
88 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(b)(3), 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11 
U .S.C. § 402(b)(3) (1976) ), provides that" ... the court may ... exercise such other powers 
as are not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter." 
89 See Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 36, Ch. VIII. But see House Bill, supra note 
36, § 904. 
90 See COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON THE BANK-
RUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., !st Sess., Pts. I 
& II (1973). 
91 American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 146 (1940). 
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the prohibitions of section 82(c), bankruptcy courts will be free to 
exercise their powers more extensively, provided they act within 
the limits of section 83(c) and the tenth amendment. Nevertheless, 
in order to ensure this result, Congress should enact statutory 
provisions consistent with the proposals advanced in this article. 
B. Judicial Control of Finances and Budgets 
Supervision of a debtor's financial affairs is the sine qua non of 
successful financial rehabilitation. As a general rule the parties, not 
the courts, formulate the plans of adjustment under the various 
chapters of the Bankruptcy Act.92 For a variety of administrative 
and constitutional reasons, the bankruptcy judge is not the proper 
authority to make the ultimate decisions regarding municipal pro-
grams. 93 Nevertheless, in a Chapter IX proceeding, the court 
should be empowered to make certain determinations which would 
provide a framework for subsequent decisions by local officials. 
There are several ways in which the bankruptcy court can make 
important contributions without undermining the responsibility of 
public officials to determine the level of public services to be 
provided. For example, the valuation of anticipated revenues is 
essential to the formulation of any successful plan, just as deter-
mining "reorganization value" is critical in corporate reorganiza-
tions. 94 The court should require that the municipality use accurate 
accounting methods in order to ensure that a realistic determina-
tion of anticipated annual revenue is utilized in formulati~g the 
92 See Ii U .S.C. §§ 569, 570, 723 (1970). 
93 See notes 100 & IOI and accompanying text infra. 
94 Reorganization value is determined by the court in a reorganization proceeding to 
ensure that the plan meets the requirements for confirmation. 6A W. COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTCY ,i 11.05 (4th ed. 1976). This value is used in determining whether an entity is solvent 
or insolvent, which classes of creditors will be allowed to participate in the reorganization, 
and whether a rehabilitation is possible or liquidation is the only reasonable alternative. Id. 
The determination of this value is based upon a reasonably informed judgment of the earning 
capacity of the business as a going concern followed by a capitalization of these projected 
earnings. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525-26 (1941). 
Reorganization value is not, however, used merely to assure that the respective priorities 
of creditors are upheld. "A basic requirement of any reorganization is the determination of a 
capitalization which makes it possible not only to respect the priorities of the various classes 
of claimants but also to give the new company a reasonable prospect for survival." Group of 
Inst. Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P., & Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 540 (1943). 
Although a bankruptcy court cannot force a municipality into liquidation proceedings, it 
must still respect the relative priorities of each class of creditors in a municipal debt 
adjustment proceeding. See note 106 and accompanying text infra. An accurate valuation of 
the city's anticipated revenues is also necessary for the court to determine whether the plan 
provides ·the city with a financial structure which will lead to future fiscal stability. 
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plan. Such judicial supervision will discourage the debtor munici-
pality from engaging in short term borrowing based upon an in-
flated estimate of anticipated revenues.95 
Nonetheless, short term borrowing may be a useful tool in the 
administration of municipal finances, since the need for cash often 
arises before anticipated revenues are realized. 96 To a financially 
struggling municipality, these cash flow problems can be critical. 
Accordingly, Chapter IX empowers the court to permit the is-
suance of certificates of indebtedness, thereby allowing the 
petitioner to raise cash before it realizes its anticipated revenues. 97 
It follows that the court should have sufficient authority to ensure 
that realized revenues are actually applied to the outstanding short 
term debt. 98 
Since the court is currently prohibited from interference with 
"any of the property or revenues of the petitioner," 99 it is difficult 
to prevent a municipality from issuing certificates of indebtedness 
beyond the amount of its yearly income. In addition, the court is 
powerless to prevent a city from borrowing from other sources, 
even when such borrowing jeopardizes the composition plan. The 
court should be granted the authority to prevent irresponsible 
borrowing, and Chapter IX should be revised to facilitate such an 
objective. 
The power to determine anticipated annual revenues, coupled 
with the power to oversee borrowing, enables the court to de-
lineate the parameters of the municipality's budget. However, the 
use of such powers should not permit judicial direction of the 
manner in which revenues are spent in the delivery of municipal 
goods and services. 100 This latter type of control might realistically 
be viewed as a form of interference with state sovereignty which 
the tenth amendment forbids. 101 However, the power to determine 
fiscal parameters could .ensure that the municipality presents to the 
95 Borrowing on the basis of an inflated estimate of anticipated revenues is not an 
uncommon municipal practice. It is also a major cause of financial collapse. Financial 
Emergencies, supra note I, at 62. 
96 Id. 
97 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(b)(2), 90 Stat. 316 (to be codified as 11 
U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (1976)). 
98 This overseer capacity would entail retention of jurisdiction by the court after confirma-
tion. See Bankroptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 96(e), 90 Stat. 325 (to be codified as 
11 U .S.C. § 416(e) (1976)). 
99 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c)(2), 90Stat.316 (to be codified as 11 
U.S.C. § 402(c)(2) (1976)). 
100 The only exception to this limitation would be the court's capacity to ensure that 
certificates of indebtedness are repaid. See note 98 and accompanying text supra. 
101 See note 76 supra. 
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court a balanced budget based upon realistic estimates of available 
resources. 102 
C. The Financial Rehabilitation 
In order for a plan of composition to be confirmed, the present 
Bankruptcy Act requires that a plan be "feasible" and "fair and 
equitable." 103 Feasibility is simply intended to mean that the 
debtor can satisfy the plan's requirements with respect to the 
repayment of creditors. 104 Application of this standard requires a 
judicial determination that the creditors will actually receive what 
the plan offers them. 105 The feasibility test is inadequate because it 
does not ensure financial rehabilitation, which should be a princi-
pal objective of the municipal debt adjustment proceeding. 
Similarly, requiring a fair and equitable plan does not compel the 
court to evaluate the prospects of future fiscal improvement. 
Rather, this provision embodies the rule established in early reor-
ganization cases that the priorities of creditors be respected and 
that creditors with a priority be fully paid before subordinate inter-
ests are allowed to benefit from the debt adjustment proceed-
ings. 106 Furthermore, the fair and equitable standard in Chapter IX 
requires the municipality to exercise its taxing power to the 
greatest practicable extent. Finally, it ensures that the plan results 
from an open bargain without any overreaching. 107 
102 The minority report to the Bankruptcy Act amendments of 1976 expresses the view 
that the municipal debt adjustment procedure should require that a balanced budget be 
presented to the court as part of the plan: 
The purpose of municipal bankruptcy is to give the municipality an opportunity 
to get its house in order and make whatever adjustments or arrangements are 
indicated with existing indebtedness so that it may emerge from the bankruptcy 
under circumstances in which it can survive. No municipality can survive unless its 
projected revenues, regardless of source, and projected expenditures, regardless of 
purpose, are in balance. We do not think that Congress intends to make available 
the extreme remedies of a stay of all adverse proceedings and involuntary composi-
tions of the debts of objecting creditors and of other benefits of Chapter IX in the 
absence of a clear municipal intent to balance its budget. 
H.R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 59. reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 81 I. 
103 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 94(b), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11 
U.S.C. § 414(b) (1976)). The proposed bankruptcy acts continue the "fair and equitable'" 
standard, and although they do not expressly require that the plan be "feasible," they do 
require that "all amounts to be paid by the debtor ... are reasonable." Proposed Bankruptcy 
Act supra note 36, § 8-307(c); House Bill, supra note 36, § 943(3). 
10
• See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-686, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 811. 
105 In re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47, 53 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U:S. 594 (1965). 
106 See, e.g., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Northern Pac. 
Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). 
101 H.R. REP. No. 94-686,.94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. 
& Ao. NEWS 811. 
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The municipal bankruptcy statute should be amended to require 
that judicial evaluation of the plan will include a determination that 
future financial reorganization or rehabilitation is lik~ly to be un-
necessary . 108 Judicial control over the borrowing and budgetary 
limits of the municipality 109 will facilitate the evaluation of the 
plan, because the control will enable the court to more accurately 
predict future revenues and expenditures. Chapter IX should be 
expanded to embrace this concept, because public policy favors 
the financial rehabilitation of municipalities. 
D. Joinder of Overseeing State Agencies 
Many states provide for the appointment of a receiver or an 
agency to oversee various affairs of financially embarassed 
municipalities. 110 If state law vests the power to govern municipal 
finances in an independent agency, a Chapter IX proceeding will be 
inadequate unless the agency is a party, since in these jurisdictions 
local officials lack the power to implement the plan. 111 Therefore, 
the Bankruptcy Act should permit joinder of such agencies as 
necessary parties to Chapter IX proceedings. Alternatively, the 
municipality's right to petition could be conditioned on the filing of 
an accompanying voluntary petition by the overseeing agency. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional authority exists for expanded judicial control in 
Chapter IX proceedings. The tenth amendment does not bar the 
type of federal expansion proposed in this article. Yet Congress 
has not adequately extended the powers of the federal bankruptcy 
court in Chapter IX proceedings. 
It must be recognized that the purpose of a Chapter IX proceed-
ing is not merely to adjust the debt of the municipality, but also to 
institute a plan which will lead to financial rehabilitation. The 
10
• In Chapter VII of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, which deals with reorganizations, this 
standard is incorporated as a reQuirement for confirmation: "The court shall confirm a plan 
if ... the plan is feasible and not likely to be followed by the liquidation of, or a need for 
further financial reorganization .... " Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 36, § 7-103(d). 
10
• See Part IV B supra. 
110 Financial Emergencies, supra note I, at 77. 
111 The Bankruptcy Act precludes confirmation of any plan if the petitioner is prohibited 
by law from taking any of the actions required to implement it. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 9, Pub. 
L. No. 94-260, § 94(b)(6), 90 Stat. 323 (to be codified as 11 U.S.C. § 414(b)(6) (1976)). This 
condition is carried over to the proposed acts. Proposed Bankruptcy Act, supra note 36, § 
8-307(c)(6); House _Bill, supra note 36, § 943(5). 
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Chapter IX petitioner should be required to receive relief only on 
such terms. Otherwise, the claims of creditors are compromised, 
and future creditors investing in a "rehabilitated" entity are likely 
to be misled. If the Bankruptcy Act is to provide effective assis-
tance to financially troubled municipalities, Congress must extend 
the powers of the federal courts in dealing with municipal debtors. 
-Daniel J. Goldberg 
